Locke, Liberty, & Necessity

For Locke, liberty and necessity are not necessarily at odds. On the spectrum of theories of freedom, he seems to fit best into the compatibilism mold. Here’s how he gets there.

First off, some definitions are in order. It is crucial to note how Locke uses the term power. For him, it means the capacity or ability to act or be acted upon. There are two sorts of power: Passive, the power to be acted upon, and active, the power to act upon. An example of each can be given. Matter has the capacity to be acted upon, while minds have the capacity to act upon something else. Another way of putting it might be passive power is the capacity to be moved, while active power is the capacity to move.

This theory about power relates to freedom in Locke’s conception of the will. He separates himself from many previous thinkers by denying that the will is a thing, a substance. Rather, it is a power, the power to begin or not begin; to act or not to act; to think or not to think. To will something requires that it be volitional, a voluntary act. Under this definition, it would be absurd to ask if the will itself was free or not free. It is not a thing that can be labeled as either.

So what does it mean to be free? It certainly does not require the possibility that all things are equally viable and possible choices. For example, I might will to fly, but being a human being, I am incapable of taking flight. I am bound by necessity to dwelling on the ground. Thus, necessity introduces a sort of limitation to freedom. Necessity can be thought of as a sort of determinate causality. One of Locke’s examples involves the collapse of a bridge. If I am on the bridge when it collapses, it is necessary that I will fall along with it, no matter what a will to happen. In this case I am not free.

Let’s go back to my first example. What if I did not will to fly? In this case, it is both volitional and necessary that I won’t fly. In Book II.11.8, Locke makes it clear how these two variables relate to one another. Without volition there can be no freedom, but volition and necessity are not mutually exclusive. Even if something x is necessary, i.e. nothing else can be done but x, if x is volitionally chosen, x is free. However, x ceases to be free the moment I cease to will x.