Saturday, March 23, 2013

Global poverty and Christianity



We have a moral obligation to help those in dire need if (1) it is within our power to do so and (2) helping doesn’t require a sacrifice of greater moral worth than not helping. I think it’s pretty clear that we collectively have the ability to not only rescue people from extreme poverty, but to provide people in those circumstances with the education and resources to sustain a way of life that eradicates extreme poverty without having wealthy nations continuously playing a direct role. I don’t think the question is, ‘should we give them a fish or teach them how to fish’—both are needed.

And this moral argument proceeds just fine before Christianity is factored in.

Anyone who considers the Bible to be a source of normative morality would be hard-pressed to find a loophole out of the moral obligation reason alone seems to impose on us. The Bible is absolutely full of descriptive and prescriptive language regarding poverty, and throughout the scope of scripture there is a clear sense that poverty does carry moral weight—and those who contribute to poverty and those who ignore poverty are held accountable.

This theme is extremely prominent in the prophetic books. Isaiah, a harsh indictment against Judah, centers around the people’s practicing ritual worship while failing to “defend the orphan and the widow’s cause” (1:23). Chapter 58 very specifically deals with the obsession to “draw near to God” while fasting, but the people are condemned for turning a blind eye to the oppression going on around them—or being caused by them.

The people of Israel are also called out in Amos after a tour de force of indictments against the neighboring peoples because they “trample the head of the poor into the dust of the earth, and push the afflicted out of the way” (2:7).

Micah 6:8 famously instructs God’s people to “do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with God.”

In Zechariah, the failure to uphold God’s command to “not oppress the widow, the orphan, the alien, or the poor” is given as a theological reason for why the people were scattered and taken into captivity. There are far more examples in the rest of the prophets than I can go into.

And of course the New Testament is full of admonitions to protect and provide for the last, the lost, and the least.

The point is, we have a moral obligation to work towards dealing with extreme poverty sans religion. Christianity does nothing to blunt what is already clear-cut; in fact, it commands us to do what our moral intuitions already tell us—that we must defend the cause of those who cannot defend themselves.

Thursday, March 14, 2013

Dinner Parties, euthanasia, and choice




                                          Photo of 
                                          David VellemanIn his essay “Against the Right to Die,” J. David Velleman argues that euthanasia can be harmful, not necessarily in itself, but that being presented with the option alone will inherently have a negative impact on people. He’s not arguing that one might be able to choose wrongly if the choice is being presented. The weight of his argument rests on the burdening an individual with a choice at all.

In the essay, Velleman presents an example involving a dinner party invitation. Being presented with an invitation forces a choice one way or the other—should the invitation be accepted or rejected? The decision is totally up to the recipient of the invitation: he or she can either turn it down and not dine with the host, essentially changing nothing about the status quo, or accept it and attend the party. Additionally, the recipient can make the choice that will be best, i.e. the one that will maximize utility. However, a choice must be made. If the recipient had never had the invitation extended in the first place, he or she would “default” to not dining with the host, just like any other night.

Velleman also presents the case of a cashier, which perhaps illustrates the harm that having options can incur more plainly than the example of the dinner invitation. In this example, Velleman argues that a cashier is better off not having the ability to unlock the safe in the store, because simply knowing how to open the safe makes her more vulnerable to being targeted by armed thieves. The point is, again, that it is possible that some people may be harmed simply by having an option presented to them.

Velleman applies this point to the case of euthanasia in the same fashion. He argues that being presented with the option of euthanasia can, in itself, incur harm. He forwardly acknowledges that there are cases when it may be in someone’s best interest to die, and to die via an act of euthanasia. However, the problem arises in the offering of the option in the first place.

Perhaps in a perfect world, euthanasia would only be offered to ∙those who would not be harmed by euthanasia and to ∙those who desire euthanasia. However, it is unavoidable that at least some people will be offered the choice of euthanasia, even though it is not in their best interest. Velleman believes that this circumstance should prompt us as a society not to widely offer the choice of euthanasia. Being presented with the option of euthanasia by itself strips the patient of the default position of staying alive.

What do you think of euthanasia? Is it wrong in itself? Should it be routinely offered as an option to terminally ill patients? Or is being presented with the option the problem, as Velleman suggests?