All of these debates revolve around the concept of jus ad bellum—the justice of war,
specifically declaring or entering war in the first place. Jus ad
bellum deals with the questions of whether countries are justified in
declaring war, and in what circumstances such an extreme approach to
international problem solving can be taken. The different viewpoints outlined
above are all responses to the question, was Operation Iraqi Freedom just? And
as a facet of Just War Theory, all of these arguments revolve around the basic
idea that a war in itself can be
just.
However,
what if the premise that a just war
is possible, the foundational idea that all of the previous positions were
built up, is not granted? Maybe the question should not revolve around whether
or not a war is just. Perhaps there is no instance in which a war can be just. Prima facie, it seems like pacifism
would follow from denying the possibility of a just war, but that is not what I
am arguing for. In fact, pacifism can stem from the very same deontological
roots that Just War Theory arises from. Instead, I am arguing that the category
of justice cannot be applied to war at all.
For
many, it seems intuitive that war can be thought of as just. To pressure the
hinges of the morally upright war could be thought of as unpatriotic or even a
denial of history. Of course, there are times when what seems intuitive to us
isn’t right. Our intuitions will hopefully point us in the right direction, but
a closer look should always be given to see if they are consistent with
reality. In the case of just war, perhaps the intuition that a just war is
possible is misguided.
A problem for
thinking of war in terms of justice arises quickly when examining the nature of
war and justice individually. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says war
should be understood as “an actual, intentional and widespread
armed conflict between political communities.”[1]
The fact that war is violent aggression between political communities is incredibly significant. While political
communities are many things, I believe it would be a stretch to label them as
being morally equivalent to persons. Indeed, political communities are not
capable of moral standing at all. The people within the political communities
themselves can be just or unjust, but the system, as a system, has no moral
capacity of its own. Consequently, I do not think that the concept of justice,
understood in deontological terms of desert, can be applied to political
communities.
But
questions about war and morality will not go away just because, in theory, war
and justice are incompatible by way of syntax. Can war still be waged? And if
so, under what circumstances? Like I alluded to earlier, I do not think that
the non-justice of war directly leads to pacifism. While I do not think that
any moral “oughts” apply to political communities, there are certainly actions
that will benefit the people that compose the political community. Perhaps war
should be thought of in terms of utility, rather than justice. This allows for
the reality of war without white-washing its horrors with grandiose claims of moral
righteousness.
A
classic example given of a just war is the resistance of the Allied forces
during World War II. Admittedly, this example carries an enormous intuitive
pull. Everyone’s gut reaction is that the Allies were right to attack Nazi Germany, because the Nazis were evil. I would say that the atrocity of
the holocaust was morally wrong by any standard—deontological, utilitarian, or
otherwise—and many within the Nazi party were morally culpable of unimaginable
wrongdoing. But I do not think the blatant moral shortcomings of the people who
carried out these atrocities leads to the conclusion that the political
community can be thought of in the moral terms of justice. Remember, I am
arguing that war, waged by political communities, cannot be thought of morally
in the same terms as individual persons. So while I do think it was a good thing that the Allies overthrew Hitler, I do
not think that the state of Germany deserved
it. It was a good thing because of the effect it had on people.
Major
consideration needs to be given to how war is currently thought of by the
international community. International law is built primarily around the idea
of Just War Theory, and legislates under what circumstances war can be waged.
Do all of the laws need to be rewritten? When should the international
community “step back” and let political communities declare war? The rejection
of deontological justice does not necessarily lead to the total disposal of all
current laws. There may be quite a bit of overlap between the “oughts” of Just
War Theory and the practices that increase utility. Perhaps many of the current
laws regarding jus ad bellum exist
because of the ends they seek to
produce, not because the constraints are right in and of themselves. In this
case, international law may be thought of in terms of Rule Utilitarianism, a set of rules that consistently produce
utility when followed.
From
what has been said so far, it should now be apparent that a rejection of just
war is not a rejection of reasonable war, at least as far as reasonableness can
be applied to war. I hope that it is obvious that stripping war of moral imperatives
does not mean that all wars are equal, or that both warring parties are on the same
level. Rather, the causes for war must be reasonable in utilitarian terms. The
issue of international law highlights this well. To produce the best end
possible, a war should only be fought as a last resort, with a high probability
of success, and with a consideration of proportionality. A truly utilitarian
view will seek the good for all involved,
not just the ultimate victory of the side one is on. And so it appears that,
although moral categories like justice cannot strictly be applied to political
communities, a sort of utilitarian simulation of Just War Theory can be
produced.
So
how should the opening questions be framed, if not in terms of justice? Instead
of asking whether or not the United States had just cause to invade Iraq, maybe
it would be better to ask if it were prudent, or beneficial, or in the best
interest for the United States to invade Iraq. While the outcome may be the
same in many cases, the route is different, if ever so slightly. But by denying
that political communities have any inherent morality in themselves is
certainly an interesting exercise in understanding how morality operates. In
the end this conversation has a decidedly non-utilitarian tone: the end may be
the same whether one accepts Just War Theory or some utilitarian alternative.
But in the end, this really isn’t a problem for the utilitarian. Maybe Just War
Theory, especially as practiced by the international community, will itself lead to
the greater good.
[1] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/
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