Some thoughts on capital punishment

After an extended break from blogging due to a crazy schedule last semester, I'm back. For the next few weeks I'll be posting some thoughts I've had--mostly in regards to ethical issues that affect contemporary life.

In Jeffry Reiman’s essay The Folly of Capital Punishment, he argues that the death penalty is barbaric and should not be utilized in civilized societies. He concedes that the death penalty fulfills the requirements of retribution, i.e. it is deserved and satisfies the demands of justice in a retributive sense. However, he also posits that life imprisonment is a just punishment that satisfies the demands of justice. In addition, he argues that the death penalty is no more effective at deterring grave crimes (like murder) than life imprisonment.

Critical to his argument is his comparison of torture and other barbaric punishments to capital punishment. Reiman says that two key features that make torture repugnant are shared by capital punishment, namely

1)      Intense pain is inflicted on the accused and

2)      That person is completely subjected to the power of others.

But are these grounds for classifying capital punishment as horrible, like Reiman does? And even if they are, is life imprisonment different in any appreciable way?

It can be argued that life imprisonment falls under both of these categories. Reiman does not limit pain to a physical response. Indeed, the psyche carries the brunt of the punishment in his description of capital punishment. It is primarily the psychological pain that he objects to. But it could also be argued that life imprisonment causes significant psychological discomfort and pain. Reiman quotes Camus, saying “a man is undone by waiting for capital punishment well before he dies.” But it isn’t too much of a stretch to say that a man may be undone by wasting away behind bars long before he dies. The psychological pain inflicted upon those imprisoned may be thought of as part and parcel of their punishment.

As for the second point, it seems clear that a person who is imprisoned—especially for life—is subjected completely to the power of others. It is in this complete subjection that psychological pain is inflicted. Being forced to live in a prison cell against one’s will certainly seems like a way for the state to exert total power over a person’s life.

While capital punishment may be deemed horrible, as defined by the two premises above, it isn’t clear that Reiman’s alternative of life imprisonment is in any appreciable way exempt from this objection. And it would certainly be possible for a person to dispute his claim that life imprisonment satisfies the demands of justice in all cases. Perhaps there are times when capital punishment is what is justly deserved. If both capital punishment and life imprisonment are equally horrible, desert may be the appropriate measure in determining which punishment should be meted out.