In Philosophy and Christianity, two "big" papers are required. This is my first paper, in which I argue for a continuation of personal identity after death assuming a materialistic view of human nature.
Introduction
For millennia, human beings from different continents and various cultures have believed in diverse forms of continued existence after death. While the concept of some sort of afterlife has been widely accepted at a fundamental level in many cultures, these different cultures and their accompanying religions have diverged radically on what the nature[1] of this existence is like. Continued existence could be the realization of the perfectly good end of the individual,[2] but even this is not a very useful definition as the good of an individual is perceived quite differently across socio-cultural settings. Additionally, some religions posit a hellish fate for some, or even most, of humanity.
However, determining the nature of continued existence itself is not the only problem that has to be dealt with when considering the prospect of an afterlife. For anyone to enjoy (or loathe) their existence after this life, they must continue to exist as the same person[3] they are now in the next. Thus the question of how[4] persons can continue to exist after death must be addressed. That is the primary concern of this paper.
What
Is the Nature of the Afterlife?
Before this second question is addressed, though, a little bit of groundwork on the nature of the afterlife must be done. Our notion of any future existence will directly affect the way we think persons can continue to exist after death. Needless to say, there are a plethora of views on the nature of the afterlife. For the sake of brevity, I will only consider three very broad views held by Christians.[5]
First, there is the view that souls go off to eternal bliss in heaven or to eternal damnation in hell. Heaven, in this case, is some “other place,” somewhere that is distinctly not earth. The same goes for hell. Ultimately, some sort of disembodied existence is the order of things.[6] The emphasis here is placed on the essence of a person basking in the presence and glory of God or being separated from that presence for all of eternity.
Second, there is the popular[7] view in which, again, souls go off to a blissful existence in heaven or off to hell after death. What makes this view distinct from the first is that this disembodiment is not an eternal affair. At some point in time, souls are united with some sort of body.[8] Eternal embodied existence then ensues, either in a heavenly realm or on a recreated earth.
The third view rejects the common element of the first two views: an immaterial soul. Instead, persons are physically resurrected with “spiritual bodies,” as Paul describes in 1 Corinthians 15. This point is shared with the second view – however, no separate substance, i.e. and immaterial soul, is assumed to link the body possessed in this life with the body possessed in the next.[9]
Underlying these three views are two metaphysical accounts of human nature. The first two views are brands of dualism.[10] The dualist account of human nature is that the essential component for personal identity and continuity resides in an immaterial soul. Dualism is, prima facie, the dominant view of American evangelicals. This is played out missionally; souls are what need to be saved, not bodies.[11] Everyone’s body will die, but everyone’s soul will go on to judgment in the afterlife. While the second view from above may claim that a disembodied soul suffers a truncated existence, the soul is still the necessary and sufficient source of personal identity, and provides a vehicle for persistency of identity after death. A key advantage of the dualist position for those who hope for an afterlife is that one substance is continuous through time.[12]
The third view relies on a materialist, or physicalist, account of human nature. Materialism denies that human creatures have any non-physical parts. There is no immaterial soul; there is no immaterial mind.[13] Materialists would say the burden of proof rests on dualists, because it is claimed that neuroscience, psychology, and other branches of science have given us a picture of human nature that leaves nothing for a soul to do. Furthermore, a Christian materialist could point to the fact that the Bible does not seem to assume that human beings are inherently immortal, but rather existence after death is contingent upon a divine act of resurrection.
Before this second question is addressed, though, a little bit of groundwork on the nature of the afterlife must be done. Our notion of any future existence will directly affect the way we think persons can continue to exist after death. Needless to say, there are a plethora of views on the nature of the afterlife. For the sake of brevity, I will only consider three very broad views held by Christians.[5]
First, there is the view that souls go off to eternal bliss in heaven or to eternal damnation in hell. Heaven, in this case, is some “other place,” somewhere that is distinctly not earth. The same goes for hell. Ultimately, some sort of disembodied existence is the order of things.[6] The emphasis here is placed on the essence of a person basking in the presence and glory of God or being separated from that presence for all of eternity.
Second, there is the popular[7] view in which, again, souls go off to a blissful existence in heaven or off to hell after death. What makes this view distinct from the first is that this disembodiment is not an eternal affair. At some point in time, souls are united with some sort of body.[8] Eternal embodied existence then ensues, either in a heavenly realm or on a recreated earth.
The third view rejects the common element of the first two views: an immaterial soul. Instead, persons are physically resurrected with “spiritual bodies,” as Paul describes in 1 Corinthians 15. This point is shared with the second view – however, no separate substance, i.e. and immaterial soul, is assumed to link the body possessed in this life with the body possessed in the next.[9]
Underlying these three views are two metaphysical accounts of human nature. The first two views are brands of dualism.[10] The dualist account of human nature is that the essential component for personal identity and continuity resides in an immaterial soul. Dualism is, prima facie, the dominant view of American evangelicals. This is played out missionally; souls are what need to be saved, not bodies.[11] Everyone’s body will die, but everyone’s soul will go on to judgment in the afterlife. While the second view from above may claim that a disembodied soul suffers a truncated existence, the soul is still the necessary and sufficient source of personal identity, and provides a vehicle for persistency of identity after death. A key advantage of the dualist position for those who hope for an afterlife is that one substance is continuous through time.[12]
The third view relies on a materialist, or physicalist, account of human nature. Materialism denies that human creatures have any non-physical parts. There is no immaterial soul; there is no immaterial mind.[13] Materialists would say the burden of proof rests on dualists, because it is claimed that neuroscience, psychology, and other branches of science have given us a picture of human nature that leaves nothing for a soul to do. Furthermore, a Christian materialist could point to the fact that the Bible does not seem to assume that human beings are inherently immortal, but rather existence after death is contingent upon a divine act of resurrection.
The
Problem
For the rest of this paper, I will assume that the third view of the afterlife is true,[14] along with all of its metaphysical implications, namely, that humans beings do not have any non-physical parts. Armed with this working picture of the afterlife, the question of how any person can continue to exist post mortem can be addressed.
At this point, a definition of “person” would be helpful. John Locke says a person is “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.”[15] Most definitions of persons include some element of rationality and self-consciousness. The dualist can appeal to the soul as the source of self-consciousness, but the materialist must argue that consciousness is a mental property of the brain. But death renders the brain permanently incapable of having mental properties, and in the natural course of events, the person would cease to exist.
And so an obvious problem arises for the Christian materialist regarding the continuation of persons. How can personal identity be retained if there is an existential gap due to the death of the person? To put it another way, how can “my” resurrected body be numerically identical[16] to “me” now if “I” cease to exist for a period of time between? This falls under the broader problem of personal identity, and it is a problem philosophers have been wrestling with for millennia.[17]
What is needed for a continuity of existence, then? Must every part remain the same, as Hume suggests?[18] Must some essential part(s) continue to exist? Or is continuous existence a requirement for something to remain the same?
For the rest of this paper, I will assume that the third view of the afterlife is true,[14] along with all of its metaphysical implications, namely, that humans beings do not have any non-physical parts. Armed with this working picture of the afterlife, the question of how any person can continue to exist post mortem can be addressed.
At this point, a definition of “person” would be helpful. John Locke says a person is “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.”[15] Most definitions of persons include some element of rationality and self-consciousness. The dualist can appeal to the soul as the source of self-consciousness, but the materialist must argue that consciousness is a mental property of the brain. But death renders the brain permanently incapable of having mental properties, and in the natural course of events, the person would cease to exist.
And so an obvious problem arises for the Christian materialist regarding the continuation of persons. How can personal identity be retained if there is an existential gap due to the death of the person? To put it another way, how can “my” resurrected body be numerically identical[16] to “me” now if “I” cease to exist for a period of time between? This falls under the broader problem of personal identity, and it is a problem philosophers have been wrestling with for millennia.[17]
What is needed for a continuity of existence, then? Must every part remain the same, as Hume suggests?[18] Must some essential part(s) continue to exist? Or is continuous existence a requirement for something to remain the same?
Possible
Solutions
It seems as though either common parts or continuous existence are required for numerically identical objects to exist at different times. Spatiotemporal continuity is apparently needed. Note that it is possible to continue to exist with only one of the two.[19] Some would argue that having the same parts is enough for persons to continue to exist as numerically identical beings, but I would disagree.[20] Some form of continuous existence seems to be the more important factor.[21]
Peter van Inwagen argues that some “naked kernel” must continue to exist for a person to be resurrected. He is asking for both of the above criteria. At death, God miraculously preserves some essential part of the brain, and at the resurrection, this “naked kernel” is incorporated into the person’s new body.[22] This fulfills the need to have some parts continuing spatiotemporally. But for this to occur, some seemingly deceptive part swapping happens. The apparent deception here proves troubling to many. Additionally, it has the potential to create a logical problem. If corpse X is the person and naked kernel K is the person, and X and K exist at the same time, then X is numerically identical to K, which results in a logical absurdity.[23] Another problem with this theory is that it doesn’t seem to allow for a continuation of self-consciousness, or even a sufficient medium in which self-consciousness could exist in, which was identified as a key part of personal identity. No single part makes up self-consciousness.
Lynne Baker’s Constitution View of persons takes a more radical step in the sense that she believes persons can survive a spatiotemporal gap. In her view, persons are not merely their bodies, but rather they are constituted by their bodies. What makes a person a distinct individual is the first-person perspective that subsists “within” a body. A benefit of this idea is that it opens up the possibility for first-person perspective to be constituted by different bodies.[24] Of course, one of the difficulties here is determining whether some resurrected person actually has the same first-person perspective as the body that constituted it before death.
It seems as though either common parts or continuous existence are required for numerically identical objects to exist at different times. Spatiotemporal continuity is apparently needed. Note that it is possible to continue to exist with only one of the two.[19] Some would argue that having the same parts is enough for persons to continue to exist as numerically identical beings, but I would disagree.[20] Some form of continuous existence seems to be the more important factor.[21]
Peter van Inwagen argues that some “naked kernel” must continue to exist for a person to be resurrected. He is asking for both of the above criteria. At death, God miraculously preserves some essential part of the brain, and at the resurrection, this “naked kernel” is incorporated into the person’s new body.[22] This fulfills the need to have some parts continuing spatiotemporally. But for this to occur, some seemingly deceptive part swapping happens. The apparent deception here proves troubling to many. Additionally, it has the potential to create a logical problem. If corpse X is the person and naked kernel K is the person, and X and K exist at the same time, then X is numerically identical to K, which results in a logical absurdity.[23] Another problem with this theory is that it doesn’t seem to allow for a continuation of self-consciousness, or even a sufficient medium in which self-consciousness could exist in, which was identified as a key part of personal identity. No single part makes up self-consciousness.
Lynne Baker’s Constitution View of persons takes a more radical step in the sense that she believes persons can survive a spatiotemporal gap. In her view, persons are not merely their bodies, but rather they are constituted by their bodies. What makes a person a distinct individual is the first-person perspective that subsists “within” a body. A benefit of this idea is that it opens up the possibility for first-person perspective to be constituted by different bodies.[24] Of course, one of the difficulties here is determining whether some resurrected person actually has the same first-person perspective as the body that constituted it before death.
Supernatural
and Biological Copies[25]
The materialist position that I will argue for is a species of spatiotemporal non-continuity, similar to Baker’s. That is, resurrected person R can be numerically identical to mortal person M with (1) no common parts[26] and (2) an existential gap.[27] I will appeal to copying processes that seems to allow for numerical identity to be granted to two distinct and qualitatively different bodies.
The materialist position that I will argue for is a species of spatiotemporal non-continuity, similar to Baker’s. That is, resurrected person R can be numerically identical to mortal person M with (1) no common parts[26] and (2) an existential gap.[27] I will appeal to copying processes that seems to allow for numerical identity to be granted to two distinct and qualitatively different bodies.
The identity of some objects does depend on common parts and continuous existence. For example, if my Xbox1 stopped working and I sent it in to be fixed, Microsoft would likely send me a new Xbox2 with entirely different parts. Although Xbox2 would be qualitatively identical to my original Xbox1, as the parts would all be of the same type, it would not be numerically identical to my original Xbox1. It would only be a copy. I might not be able to tell the difference between Xbox1 and Xbox2, but my perception of them has no bearing on their ontological reality.
But are all objects like Xboxes? Let’s consider the processes by which biological organisms proceed through spatiotemporal existence. The current scientific model demonstrates that enormous numbers of particles are used and discarded by biological organisms over the course of their lifetime. This is true for humans. While the rate of turnover depends on cellular function and the individual’s metabolic rate, most every particle is replaced at some point.
Not only are raw materials cycled through the body at an extremely high rate; nearly all the cells in your body are constantly being copied via mitosis and cytokinesis.[28] The cell cycle does an outstanding job conserving the code of the original DNA, but copying isn’t perfect. Mutations accumulate and teleomeric degradation occurs over time, leading to an environment where necessary functional proteins can no longer be produced, resulting in cell death and ultimately the death of the organism.
So it would seem that Theseus’s paradox applies not only to ships, but to biological organisms as well. Every particle in an 80 year old’s body (A) is different from the particles that composed that person’s body (B) when they were a baby. If we took all of the particles that composed person B and reassembled them at the time of person A’s existence, we would not claim that that person A = B. However, in the natural order of things,[29] we would consider that person A = B, not qualitatively, but numerically.[30]
Now it appears that identity does not depend on the sameness of parts over time. If it did, persons could not persist through time. Elements are constantly being taken in and excreted; cells are constantly dividing and dying. Our bodies obviously change parts quite frequently via the reliable, though not infallible, biological copying process. But the copies this process produces seem different in kind from the sort of copying Microsoft does with Xboxes. They are not mere copies that don’t allow for numerical identity. Instead, they produce numerically identical bodies through a reliable copying mechanism.
That brings us to my central claim. If reliable, but fallible copying processes are sufficient to retain numerical identity on earth, why wouldn’t God’s resurrection of persons via a reliable and infallible supernatural copying process be sufficient to retain numerical identity after an existential gap?[31] Our first-person perspective as thinking beings is a result of a neurological state, but the medium itself is not so important, and certainly not the specific particles that make up the medium. As such, our first person perspective can survive certain kinds of copying – after all, it is the product of the biological copying process even now.
There are some difficulties with this view, though. Like van Inwagen’s view, a perspective relying on any sort of copying is susceptible to absurdities. If God can create one copy of you (A), then isn’t it conceivable that he could create another copy (B) of you? And if A = B at the same point in time, an absurdity arises.[32] Both can’t be you, in the sense that they both have your first-person perspective. Of course, a possible response to this is that, while God could create two persons from one original person, he has no reason to. Another possibility is that is it logically impossible for God to create two copies of a person, because it is impossible for God to create a situation that would result in a logical absurdity. In this case, it is assumed that God can only do that which is logically possible.
Another difficulty lies in the empty tomb. Paul says that Jesus is the model of how resurrection works, and the Biblical account indicates that Jesus’ physical body was actually continuous with his glorified body. But this view does not have any more trouble with this particular problem than any other views. In fact, tossing out the stipulation that common parts are required for the numerical identity of persons may save us some headache. After all, those who died 2,000 ago have long since decayed and their particles have been incorporated into other people’s bodies. Any view that requires common parts will run into the problem that every individual’s parts have been a part of another living organism at some point in time.
A final problem is this. If we can continue to exist as same persons via reliable copying processes, then what do we make of possible human efforts towards some kind of “resurrection?” Perhaps this is not a problem, but rather an interesting wrinkle. The biological copying process is not necessary, but rather it is contingent. A different sort of copying process might be employed. What implications would cloning or teleportation have on the continuity of the identity of persons? While we may believe God would not create a scenario in which multiple resurrection “copies” are numerically identical, the same moral constraints may not be binding for humans.
Conclusion
In summation, I have presented a handful of cases arguing for the possibility that Christian materialists can reasonably believe that persons can survive the existential gap between this life and the life to come. Common parts and a continuous existence do not seem to be necessary, as human persons are biological organisms that continue to exist by the constant and reliable replication of their microscopic parts. Finally, if God so desired, he would be capable of creating numerically identical copies of persons by employing a reliable and infallible supernatural copying process in a responsible way.[33]
In summation, I have presented a handful of cases arguing for the possibility that Christian materialists can reasonably believe that persons can survive the existential gap between this life and the life to come. Common parts and a continuous existence do not seem to be necessary, as human persons are biological organisms that continue to exist by the constant and reliable replication of their microscopic parts. Finally, if God so desired, he would be capable of creating numerically identical copies of persons by employing a reliable and infallible supernatural copying process in a responsible way.[33]
[1] i.e. What the afterlife is like.
[2] Of course many, many more ideas
could be presented, but for the sake of the focused nature of this paper, gross
generalizations must be employed in this introduction.
[3] Sameness of personhood here
refers to not to qualitatively identical objects, but numerically identical
objects.
[4] This is a matter of identity.
More on that later.
[5] Obviously some gross
generalization is entailed here!
[6] Of course, an eternal,
disembodied existence does not line up with the resurrection language used by
the NT writers or millennia of church tradition.
[7] In my admittedly limited
experiences with American Christianity, as well as my reading on this topic, this
seems to be the most common view held among evangelicals.
[8] From Paul: “A spiritual body.”
This view does not deny the importance of the body. Many would argue that a
disembodied soul suffers some sort of truncated existence, and that embodiment
is necessary for persons to be fully realized.
[9] The fate of the damned can vary
here – anywhere from non-existence to a fully embodied conscious eternal
torment in a literal, physical hell.
[10] Brands of dualism in
Christianity can vary widely, from Neoplatonic to Cartesian to others.
[11] The ramifications of this kind
of thinking are not confined to the afterlife, but extend to this life as well.
[12] This has the potential of making
the problem of persistence much easier to answer!
[13] Materialists generally hold some
form of the Computational Theory of the Mind, where the brain = the mind.
[14] From here on, I am more
concerned with how persons can
continue to exist after death, so the nature
of that existence will take a back seat. For simplicity’s sake, I won’t
bother with hell.
[15] Essay II.27.9
[16] The distinction between
numerical identity and qualitatively identity is important. To claim that X is
the same as Y numerically is to claim that X = Y. For this to be the case, X
and Y must not be extensionally distinguishable. To claim that X and Y are merely
qualitatively identical is to claim that X ≠ Y. While X and Y may appear to be
the same, they are in fact extensionally distinguishable.
[17] That being said, it’s obvious
that there’s no way in hell I’m going to solve the problem here.
[18] Mereological essentialism is
hard to maintain, especially when regarding persons. For a person to remain the
same, absolutely nothing about the person can change. Persons could not exist
for any length of time, because any activity, e.g. blinking, would destroy the
person and leave another in its place. Perhaps a dualist could argue that the
soul is a simple substance, and thus unchangeable.
[19] As a disjunction.
[20] As biological organisms, we are
constantly changing parts. But more on that later.
[21] This is a point where it would
be quite convenient to appeal to an immaterial soul. But we don’t want to
believe in a soul just because it makes life easier for the philosopher!
[22] Peter van Inwagen. “Dualism and
Materialism: Athens and Jerusalem?” Faith
and Philosophy 12 (October 1995).
[23] Van Inwagen is one of the most
influential philosophers to argue for the necessity of spatiotemporal
continuation, so I chose him to be the representative of this view. There are
permutations of this view, but there is not sufficient space to discuss them
here.
[24] In which case qualitatively
different bodies constitute a numerically identical first-person perspective.
[25] The inspiration for this comes
from one of Don Wacome’s lectures in Philosophy of Natural Science.
[26] No shared essential parts and no
shared “trivial” parts.
[27] A break in continuous existence.
[28] The current state of
neuroscience is complicated. The old claim that neurons do not divide after an
early stage in development is contested. At the very least, the hippocampus and
olfactory lobe have been shown to generate new cells, and experiments seem to
indicate that even the cerebral cortex is capable of new cell growth.
[29] i.e. over a span of time
[30] Note the difference from the
Xbox scenario.
[31] Argument by analogy
[32] There cannot be two distinct yet
numerically identical persons existing at the same time. A contradiction
arises.
[33] That is, he would not allow for
a scenario where multiple persons would vie for numerical identity.
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